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Abstract
Those who I call meta-skeptics in my paper argue that one should
suspend judgment about every philosophical question. Most
often they use the argument from disagreement to show that the
suspension of our philosophical beliefs is our epistemic obligation.
In the present paper I argue against the main motivation for
this view and show that since even the meta-skeptics’ stance is
a contested philosophical one, their argument cannot succeed
without refuting itself. Various meta-skeptics proposed counter-
objections to this self-refutation objection. I consider here Jason
Brennan’s quite simple and Bryan Frances’s more sophisticated
counter-objections. Their proposals are even more interesting
because they differ from the typical points of meta-skeptics:
Brennan argues for outsider skepticism, that is non-philosophers
should suspend judgment about philosophical issues, and
Frances relies on the notion of epistemic superior instead of
epistemic peer. I consider their points in two ways: whether
their counter-objections can help regular meta-skepticism and
whether their skepticism can stand on its own. In my replies
to these proposals I show why both are problematic in each of
these two ways. Brennan says that widespread disagreement is
a sign of philosophy’s unreliability. Yet, he can only address
the charge that his point is a philosophical one and not the
objection that there can be disagreement about it. And since
there is good reason to think that even his position is subject
to disagreement, it is self-undermining. Furthermore, Brennan
does not give any reason why any first-order philosophical theory
must lack the virtues that his argument displays. Frances argues
that even if the argument from disagreement is self-refuting and
meta-skeptics have to suspend judgment about it, they might
still remain skeptics after all. In my reply I show how Frances’s
defense of his position still relies on principles that could be the
objects of further arguments from disagreement.
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There is a growing number of the advocates of meta-skepticism today.
Those who I call meta-skeptics here argue that one should suspend judg-
ment about every philosophical question. Most often these skeptics use
the argument from disagreement to show that the suspension of our
philosophical beliefs is our epistemic obligation. In the present paper I
argue against the main motivation for this view and show that since even
the meta-skeptics’ stance is a contested philosophical one their argument
cannot succeed without refuting itself. Various meta-skeptics proposed
counter-objections to this self-refutation objection. In my answers to two
counter-objections I show why both of them are problematic. I conclude
that the self-refutation objection shows that philosophers do not have
to adhere to the epistemic principle endorsed by meta-skeptics. Philoso-
phers can safely disagree with their colleagues. My conclusion implies
that avoiding every disagreement is not an option in philosophy: every
one of us is entangled in deep philosophical disagreements.
1 The Template of Meta-Skepticism
Meta-skepticism comes in various versions. For the present purposes I
think I can safely ignore some differences in various meta-skeptic pro-
posals – I will introduce some of them below. What I am going to
sketch in this section is a quite general template of the view that I think
appropriately represents some current versions of meta-skepticism.
The gist of regular meta-skepticism is that our philosophical beliefs
do not enjoy any positive epistemic status. They are epistemically irre-
sponsible, blameworthy, unjustified, unwarranted, they do not constitute
knowledge, it is irrational to believe in them, we have no entitlement to
hold them. The main point that meta-skeptics usually emphasize is that
we should suspend judgment about every philosophical question. They
suggest that suspending judgment about philosophical views is the ap-
propriate reaction to certain features of our situation.
They suggest this because they are attracted to the argument from
disagreement and the principle of peer disagreement that features in that
argument. The arguments of meta-skeptics may differ in some nuances,
but I believe that the idea is correctly captured by the following version.1
The Argument from Disagreement (AD):
AD1. Philosophers disagree about every philosophical question.
AD2. Philosophers are epistemic peers.
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AD3. If disagreements prevail among epistemic peers they should sus-
pend judgment.
AD4. Hence: Philosophers should suspend judgment about every
philosophical question.
This argument seems to be the main motivation for meta-skepticism.
The third premise here is an epistemic principle that tells us how we
should organize our epistemic practice if a certain situation arises, i.e. if
we happen to find ourselves disagreeing with peers. If we disagree with
someone and we do believe that she is a peer of ours, then we accept that
her belief in question could be right just as much as ours. According to
the principle AD3, since both of us could just as well be right, we should
acknowledge this fact by no longer endorsing our belief irrationally. That
is, we should suspend judgment about the issue.
Fortunately or unfortunately, the case is that quite prestigious and
well-informed philosophers disagree about the soundness of this argu-
ment and the validity of the epistemic principle on which the argument
turns (AD3). Some philosophers would take it to be outrageous to give
up the belief that (at least first-class) philosophers are epistemic peers.
But some (first-class) philosophers, like Robert Audi in [1], do not agree
with AD2. Some go as far as to deny AD1 and claim that philosophers do
not disagree about every (non-trivial) philosophical question and point
to some substantial consensus among philosophers. But the philosophers
whom any list of the most important dissenters to AD should include
are Thomas Kelly ([7], [8]), Alvin Plantinga ([10], [11]) and Peter van
Inwagen ([14], [15]).
This disagreement points to problems about AD. The most important
one is that in this situation, when it is a subject of peer disagreement
we should suspend judgment about it. That is, it refutes itself. So,
as we have seen, the question of the soundness of AD itself constitutes
a deep philosophical disagreement. Let’s see how this could be shown
more formally.
2 The Self-Refutation Objection
There are two versions of the argument that show the self-refuting
nature of AD (or AD3) and meta-skepticism. The first one is this.
26 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 29(3): 23–44
The Argument from the Scope of Philosophy (SP):
SP1. Meta-skeptics suggest that we should suspend judgment about
every philosophical issue.
SP2. Meta-skepticism and its motivations (AD, AD3) are themselves
philosophical issues.
SP3. Hence: According to their suggestion, meta-skeptics should sus-
pend judgment about meta-skepticism.
So far so good. But it might be a cause for alarm that the
boundaries of philosophy seem to be quite vague. And certainly, there
are some kind of limits to it, even if the line between philosophy and
non-philosophy is not clear-cut and there might be grey areas. So
maybe one could argue that meta-skepticism and its motivations are
not parts of philosophy. But in the previous section I did not only say
that meta-skepticism is a philosophical problem. I also emphasized
that it is a philosophical problem about which quite many philosophers
currently disagree. So probably if we disregard the question concerning
the scope of philosophy and only take into account this fact of dissensus
around meta-skepticism, we can get a stronger argument that has the
same effect as SP.
The Argument from the Dissensus around Meta-Skepticism
(DM):
DM1. Meta-skeptics suggest that we should suspend judgment about
every question that is a subject of peer disagreement.
DM2. There is peer disagreement about the question whether we
should suspend judgment about every question that is a subject
of peer disagreement.
DM3. Hence: Meta-skeptics should suspend judgment about the ques-
tion whether we should suspend judgment about every question
that is a subject of peer disagreement.
A plausible interpretation of the conclusions of these arguments (SP3
and DM3) is that the meta-skeptic, after she suspended her judgment
about meta-skepticism and AD3, does not have any reason not to be-
lieve any philosophical propositions that are endorsed by some peers but
disagreed by others. She does not have any obstacle anymore that would
stand in the way of believing any philosophical theories.
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3 Counter-Objections and Replies
Of course, these objections have occurred to meta-skeptics as well and
they have tried to counter them. In this part I set out to reply to two of
the counter-objections proposed by meta-skeptics. While the less typical
meta-skeptic, Jason Brennan, regards these objections apparently as un-
serious challenges, the more typical meta-skeptic, Bryan Frances, accepts
that they are indeed challenging for a skeptic like him. Their proposals
are even more interesting because they differ from the typical points of
meta-skeptics. I consider their points simultaneously in two ways there-
fore: whether they can aid regular meta-skepticism with lending their
counter-objections to regular meta-skeptics and whether they can stand
on their own. I show below why their solutions are inadequate in both
respects.
3.1 Brennan’s counter-objection
Jason Brennan is not a regular meta-skeptic, though his argument influ-
ences many (not necessarily professional) meta-skeptics today. His main
agenda is somewhat different from that of the others. Whereas other
meta-skeptics want to show that philosophers should suspend judgment
about their views, what he tries to show is that a person free of any philo-
sophical commitments should not pursue or study philosophy and has
no reason to believe any philosophical theories (he dubs this view ‘out-
sider skepticism’).2 Nevertheless, he too has to face the self-refutation
objection in both of its forms. He too relies on the point that widespread
dissensus is a sign of philosophy not being a reliable method for discov-
ering truth. And his argument is prima facie a philosophical one.
Let’s consider first what leads him to outsider skepticism. What he
takes to be the decisive case for his position is a thought-experiment
featuring someone who is neither committed to any philosophical beliefs
nor disposed towards one philosophical theory or another (cf. [2, 5])
and who is equally truth-seeking and error-avoiding.3 Brennan claims
that since philosophy is an unreliable method in leading one to truth –
as it is shown by the amount of disagreement in this field – this person
should stay away from philosophy: they should abstain from using philo-
sophical methodology and remain agnostic about philosophical issues.
Sometimes, however, he seems to claim more. His thesis is sometimes
misleadingly exaggerated and generalized in a way that it implies that
‘people not already committed to one philosophical position or another
should stay uncommitted. So [. . . ], a person who lacks philosophical be-
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liefs ought to refrain from using philosophical methodology and instead
should remain agnostic.’ [2, 2]. Nevertheless, this claim about all philo-
sophically uncommitted persons is not sustained by his argument, so I
interpret him as making the more modest claim only about those who
completely lack any dispositions towards any philosophical claims and
who are equally truth-seeking and error-avoiding.
To see why the more general claim about philosophically uncom-
mitted people would be unsupported by Brennan’s points, consider the
following. Not every uncommitted person is like the one in his thought-
experiment, some are halfway between committed philosophers and com-
plete agnostics. To many among them, some philosophical claims (even
if not entire, systematic positions) might seem to be plausible while some
other, incompatible propositions might seem to them equally or less plau-
sible (cf. [2, 5]). In both cases they may have a strong inclination to
believe the plausible claims and to make their beliefs coherent. In order
to harmonize their beliefs, they would need philosophical methodology.
Now, what is this philosophical methodology Brennan refers to? Al-
though he admits that there is disagreement about the methods of philos-
ophy [2, 1], he takes it that we can have a good grip of what philosophical
methodology is. He does not give us a definition, only a non-exhaustive
list of what he takes to be the methodology of philosophy: ’studying
arguments, making new arguments, creating new distinctions, reading
texts, debating’ [2, 4]. It must be obvious that he relies on many, if not
all of these in his paper. He makes arguments, distinguishes two kinds
of skepticism, makes use of existing literature, discusses objections, em-
ploys thought-experiments, etc. That is, while he criticizes philosophical
methodology, he uses this very methodology to arrive at his criticism.
So, after all, doesn’t this create a case against his own account?
Everything points in the direction that it does, but he counters this
problem. I have to quote here his counter-objection to what he calls
‘the argument undermines itself’ defense in full length to demonstrate
its weaknesses. Brennan here only considers SP which he phrases this
way:
The general position that philosophy is irrational fails to pass
self-inspection. ‘Philosophy is irrational’ is a philosophical
position. If philosophy is irrational, so is the view that phi-
losophy is irrational. If philosophical argumentation never
establishes any position, then the anti-philosophy position
cannot be justified by philosophical argumentation. The
Argument against Philosophy refutes the Argument against
Philosophy.
Tama´s Paa´r: Disagreement & Self-Refutation 29
He counters this by arguing the following way:
Even if this defence works, it is embarrassing if this is the
best defence philosophy has. Yet, it is not obvious that the
defence succeeds. It may just be that all philosophy is unre-
liable except anti-philosophy philosophy. The outsider scep-
tic’s position is that philosophical methodology is unlikely to
bring her to the truth about philosophical questions. One
might argue that the sceptic used philosophical reasoning to
arrive at this conclusion, and so the sceptic cannot consis-
tently be a sceptic. However, it may just be that a small
set of philosophical issues is answered and that philosophi-
cal methodology works reliably on a small set of issues, i.e.,
just in the areas needed to make the sceptic’s argument. For
instance, perhaps the sceptic needs probability, an account
of the notion of an epistemic peer, some notion of reliability,
and not much else. [2, 8–9]
The first sentence in this reply might be nothing more than name-
calling. It is quite clear from this that he thinks this objection to be
unimportant. But of course, if it turns out to be a serious challenge, the
case is even more embarrassing for meta-skeptics.
Why does Brennan say at all that it is embarrassing if the self-
refutation objection is the best defense philosophy has? This might
constitute a hint to a further counter-objection that is not present in the
rest of the text. That is, it might be a little more than just name-calling.
Possibly, what he tries to express is that he holds this defense to be too
simple. It depends only on the scope of philosophy – on labeling things as
philosophy. If one arbitrarily labels anti-philosophy as philosophy, then
she wins the debate too easily. But one should be aware that Brennan
does not give any reasons why we should not regard anti-philosophy as
philosophy. And unless we are given any explicit justification for labeling
anti-philosophy as philosophical or non-philosophical we can judge that
there is equal arbitrariness on both sides. Brennan is not in a better
position than someone who dares to employ SP against him. That is,
even if the first sentence in this quote constitutes a separate counter-
objection, it fails to be a successful one. So we can turn to the rest of
the passage where Brennan, instead of countering it more directly, tries
to evade the problem of SP.
Brennan goes on to argue that maybe anti-philosophy (meta-
skepticism, in my terminology) is the only reliable philosophy. Perhaps
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only the theoretical tools to arrive at anti-philosophy are reliable and
nothing else in philosophy. I think this very reformulation of his point
makes it apparent that, in itself, it holds no water. The same could be
claimed by anyone who is relying on any method with the same force.
So in order to be more charitable to Brennan, let’s look for arguments
that could substantiate his point.
In support of this claim he seems to point out that not many things
are needed for meta-skepticism to work: his kind of skepticism needs
to answer only ‘a small set’ of philosophical questions and it needs ‘not
much’ to work. But that is a quite puzzling point too. Many philosophers
also want to rely on just few, simple and common-sense premises and
concepts or propositions that are intuitively plausible in themselves in
making their arguments, even if they argue for something radical; Or, as
John Searle once said4, philosophical argument often tends to oscillate
between the trivial and the apocalyptic. Bertrand Russell ([13, 20])
himself remarked that ‘the point of philosophy is to start with something
so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so
paradoxical that no one will believe it.’ Given that he believed the theory
he was arguing for in this manner (i.e., logical atomism), the last part
is surely an overstatement. Needles to say, philosophers do not always
succeed in the former aspiration, to start from something evidently true.
But there are rather moderate and also rather radical philosophers who
do succeed.5
Concerning simplicity, even opposing philosophical agendas use it as
a sign of their truth. The best example might be the debate in philoso-
phy of religion: theists argue that theism is simple, atheists argue that
atheism is simple. I am inclined to think that they are both quite simple,
but from different perspectives. That is not my point though. My point
is that simplicity is not something that (all) first-order philosophical ar-
guments and theories lack. And then any philosophers whose theories
achieve the virtue of simplicity might argue just like Brennan does: ‘it
may just be that a small set of philosophical issues is answered and that
philosophical methodology works reliably on a small set of issues, i.e.
just in the areas needed to make my argument’. Therefore, simplicity
is not necessarily a sign of reliability. Nor does it safeguard us from
disagreements. (Not to mention SP that is way too simple according
to a possible interpretation of Brennan’s claim about the embarrassing
nature of SP.)
The second question that we might ask besides whether first-order
philosophical positions might be quite simple is the following: is Bren-
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nan’s case as simple as he takes it to be? Even if enough simplicity
would shield theories from being unreliable, one might doubt that Bren-
nan’s one is simple in that degree. Some of its features lend it some
complications. I will examine these again in the light of disagreements.
For example, his account of philosophical methodology is quite vague
and one surely might want to narrow it. Possibly until the point where
a particular method leads only to one particular answer, and say that
her method avoids the problems stated by Brennan.6 That would not
necessarily be a good methodology but the point is that one might want
to distinguish one’s own method from the rest of those of the other
philosophers who disagree about the particular issue in question. (In
case someone is not as charitable towards Brennan as I try to be by
attributing to him an argument concerning simplicity, one can argue that
by claiming that ‘it may just be’ that only anti-philosophy philosophy is
reliable and no other philosophy Brennan did just this.)
The attitude towards truth of the person who featured in the thought-
experiment cited above might also seem to be problematic. Brennan
himself refers to the point made by Nicholas Rescher ([12, 95–115]) who
observes that philosophers weigh cognitive values differently, and who ar-
gues that their differences in this respect cannot be fully resolved. Now,
if there are philosophers who weigh cognitive values in a different way in
contrast with our truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic, then, assuming
Brennan’s main point about dissensus to be correct, their difference is
also a warrant to suspect a problem here. Are there any philosophers
who are unlike Brennan’s agnostic in this respect? William James ([6,
28–29]) surely seems to be one and he suggests that there are others
who accompany him in this. Furthermore, Brennan construes his whole
thought-experiment because he thinks that the proper aim of philosophy
is truth. But he noted in the first place that there is disagreement about
philosophy’s goals [2, 1].
So Brennan’s case needs not only an account of probability, a notion
of an epistemic peer and of reliability as he suggests, but also a concep-
tion of philosophical methodology, a set of cognitive values presupposed,
an adequate account of the aim of the philosophical enterprise and prob-
ably other things as well.7 He needs to make theoretical decisions about
all these issues and that in turn increases the complexity of his argu-
ment. This means that his brand of skepticism is not as simple as it
might appear.
No matter how simple meta-skepticism or Brennan’s own peculiar
brand of skepticism is, it also leads to disagreements. Brennan himself
32 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 29(3): 23–44
considers some objections that could be raised (and some that were in
fact raised) by others as defenses of philosophy. He provides us with
replies, but he should be aware that he is immersed in philosophical
disagreements now. Different philosophers draw different conclusions
when it comes to meta-skepticism. But if peer disagreement shows un-
reliability, then surely our method in answering the meta-level question
of philosophy’s reliability and the epistemic status of our philosophical
theories is also unreliable. If we investigate it with his standards, Bren-
nan’s anti-philosophy strategy also displays the same vices as the whole
of philosophy.
To wrap it up: SP is not answered by Brennan, even if he only con-
siders this version of the self-refutation objection. But even if SP failed
here, the substance of DM would stand still. By basing his criticism
of philosophy on peer disagreement within the field, Brennan implic-
itly criticizes his own approach that is also disagreed by peers. So his
meta-skepticism seems to be self-undermining.
3.2 Frances’s counter-objection
Unlike Brennan, Frances is quite a typical meta-skeptic. In contrast to
Brennan, Frances only considers DM and takes the self-refutation strat-
egy seriously. Nevertheless, he still tries to evade it. He argues that
even if an argument like DM is conclusive evidence against arguments
like AD, he might remain meta-skeptic anyway. He might still have his
philosophical beliefs suspended. He relies on the notion of epistemic su-
periors and not so much on the notion of peers. I will concentrate on that
at the end of this section, but for the time being let me translate what
he says into my terms. I could represent him as saying the following.
AD3 advises us – including him – to suspend judgment about it, since
there is peer disagreement about AD3. But suspending judgment about
AD3 because of itself seems to be incoherent [4, 458]. And following
that incoherent path appears to be problematic for Frances. So to avoid
the incoherence, he cites another epistemic principle that leads him to
suspend judgment about AD3.8 This is the following rule of thumb, to
which he has a long-standing commitment (I will call it LSC for this
reason):
If you are inclined to agree with a philosophical principle, but
then you realize that it’s pretty ambitious, worrisomely self-
applying, and confusing (for you), then you should suspend
judgment on it. [4, 458]
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After using this as a reason to suspend judgment about AD3, he goes
on to explain why he remains a meta-skeptic. I will return to that part
in a minute, but let me first point out why his strategy that invokes LSC
is fundamentally flawed.
As we have seen, LSC tells against AD3 in Frances’s case. And he
takes the advice of LSC and suspends judgment about it. Yet – as I
will prove in a second –, even LSC is disagreed by epistemic peers. If
I am right about this, Frances sticks to a principle here about which
there is peer disagreement. Thus, not only LSC tells against AD3, but
also AD3 tells against believing LSC: the two principles clash. But if
a principle like LSC is disagreed by peers and one might still stick to
it, then what is it that tells us which disagreed commitment of ours
we might keep and which others we should discard? All we are told is
that LSC is a long-standing commitment: but that of course does not
help, others can have very different long-standing commitments. So, if
I am right in thinking that LSC is a subject of peer disagreement, then
Frances’s case does not seem to be a well-supported one. His choice to
keep LSC and discard AD3 is arbitrary and that is bad enough. If one
might arbitrarily stick to something that is in conflict with AD3, then
one might keep any philosophical beliefs in the same arbitrary manner.
Frances does not provide us with a decisive case for meta-skepticism.
But is LSC really a subject of peer disagreement? I promised to
demonstrate that, since it will seem to many as a dissent-proof principle.
Frances does not make it explicit that he wants to make this principle
free of any significant disagreements, but he needs to do that to avoid the
problem introduced above. He builds quite much into LSC, so it seems
that he is aware of this requirement of anything he wants to retain that
might fly in the face of AD3. For goodness’s sake, who would want to
believe anything that is pretty ambitious, worrisomely self-applying and
even confusing? Certain philosophers, I would say. Frances’s epistemic
peers and superiors, that is. First of all, a great many philosophers have
no worries about ambitiousness. Think of any philosophical extremists
here, whoever you prefer. What about worrisomely self-applying and
confusing beliefs and principles? Why would philosophers want to keep
these? I think at least some philosophers do keep these kinds of beliefs
and with a reason. Suppose there is a philosopher who is aware of
the problems of her theory: its worrisomely self-applying and confusing
nature, nevertheless she sees no better alternatives around. In the field
she is working on, every theory put forward by others seem to her to
be burdened by much greater problems. They are not only self-applying
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and confusing, but have very weak foundations, are incoherent and even
incomparably counterintuitive. In addition, though she thinks that the
problems of her theory are somewhat worrisome, she believes she can
address each of these in a relatively reassuring way. A philosopher like
the one in my example could keep her belief in the correctness of her
theory. For example, though Brennan expresses his doubt about the
self-refutation objection, he might accept that it is a bit worrisome and
he could even admit that his kind of skepticism is quite ambitious and
somewhat confusing. But that is not necessarily decisive: he thinks that
these worries are just of a minor kind compared to the problems any
(other) philosophical theory faces. I conclude that philosophers could
disagree about LSC and some of them actually do disagree about it with
Frances – even his companions in meta-skepticism might want to object
to his principle.910
And there are other things in Frances’s formulation of his counter-
objection to the self-refutation objection that other philosophers would
disagree about. Some of them are of immediate importance here, since
he could use them as a defense against what I said about the problems
of LSC.
First, he says he only endorses LSC as a rule of thumb. He also says
that (because of LSC) he endorses AD3 only as a rule of thumb as well
and he adds that ‘endorsing a rule of thumb doesn’t mean endorsing
its truth’ [4, 459]. I believe that this point is unsatisfactory. Other
philosophers do not endorse AD3 and LSC, not even as rules of thumb.
This means that even if Frances does not believe in the truth of these
principles, his attitude toward them is endangered: its appropriateness
is subject to peer disagreement. And there is nowhere to hide from that:
according to his standards he should not endorse them as rules of thumb
because of the dissenters.
Secondly, Frances also says this: ‘what I base my decision on, and
have confidence in, is the idea that [AD3] is in the vicinity of an impor-
tant truth’ [4, 459]. This is why he does endorse it as a rule of thumb.
But this reasoning faces the same objection as the last one. Let me
shortly restate my problem with that point, applying it to this claim.
AD3 as a rule of thumb and it being in the neighborhood of an impor-
tant truth are controversial commitments. Other philosophers, unlike
Frances, are not committed to these claims and they do not base their
decisions on either AD3 or LSC. So Frances is at odds with them when he
does just that. And that is a problem in the light of his meta-skepticism.
Thirdly, Frances explicitly admits that even if someone asked him ‘Is
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AD3 true?’, he would answer that he does not know. Furthermore, he
would answer the same way the question ‘How much credence do you put
in AD3?’ [4, 458]. Later, he admits explicitly that he does not believe
AD3 is true [4, 459]. It seems to me that his confessions cannot answer
the problems raised above: if one would ask whether he is committed to
LSC and whether he is confident in thinking that there is truth in the
vicinity of AD3 he would have to say ‘yes’ and this would reveal that his
position in this regard clashes with those of other philosophers. But the
point in question now is whether these confessions might constitute a
good defense if we take it in itself and we disregard the other statements
of Frances. Probably what he wants to express with this is that he
takes no position with regard to AD3’s truth-value. And if he takes
no position, then obviously his position cannot be a controversial one –
because he does not have one. Yet, this is even harder to swallow than
the last two points and for two reasons.
The first reason is this. Even if he tells us he does not know the
answer to the questions raised, he may have beliefs regarding them while
thinking that these beliefs do not amount to knowledge. This would lead
to the same problems raised above. So suppose we accept that he cannot
tell how much credence he puts in AD3 because he does not know the
answer to this question. But in that case too there is an answer to it. To
illustrate this, you might think of latent racists. They may say they don’t
know whether they hate colored people or not. Even more probably, they
would deny that they hate them. Nevertheless, they can be subjects of
self-deception and they may have beliefs that are relatively hidden from
them that cause them to discriminate colored people. This might be
analogous to Frances’s case, yet I don’t think he is necessarily a subject
of self-deception. Plausibly, there is indeed an amount of credence he
puts in AD3 (whatever the exact amount might be, from 0 to 1), and
since he can’t tell this, he is necessarily ignorant about the fact regarding
his degree of belief even though there is a fact of the matter. So even
if Frances doesn’t know and cannot tell how much credence he puts in
AD3, there is an answer to that. Let’s say, he puts .5 credence in AD3.
(I guess it should be over .4 since he bases some decisions on it, but this
is not so important and I am definitely not implying that we are able
to assign to someone a degree of credence in a given proposition that he
himself seems unable to assign herself.) Yet, others put more credence in
it (some meta-skeptics) and still others put less (non-meta-skeptics). So
he is in a contested situation, even if he does not know all the facts about
that. He can know enough to see that whatever amount of credence he
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puts in AD3, his position is subject of disagreement in any case.
The second reason why one should not accept this defense of Frances
is the following. Suppose that my previous point is misguided and he
really does not take a position about AD3, there is no answer to the
question how much credence he puts in AD3. But in that case he is still
surrounded by disagreement that makes his case a self-refuting one. He
is not in the position like someone who has never considered AD3: he
did consider it and then took no position. He withheld judgment – his
belief is suspended, just like his belief is suspended with regard to any
other philosophical proposition he encountered after this one. But others
reacted differently. Some came to believe AD3 (and suspended judgment
about philosophical theories), other people came to believe that AD3 is
false (and they retained their philosophical beliefs). Frances arrived at
another solution (if we might call it that way): he did not believe in
AD3, nor did he believe in its falseness. He suspended judgment about
it. But this reaction is anything but an object of consensus: both of the
other parties dissent to it. They may have arguments for that, or they
may not: either case, they do not share the meta-skeptic’s attitude.
A point made by Plantinga seems to be highly applicable here.
He defines disagreement as ‘adopting conflicting propositional attitudes
with respect to a given proposition’ [10, 177]. What Frances’s strategy
amounts to is what Plantinga labels ‘dissenting’ which is nothing else
but a sub-category of disagreement.11 After all, it is quite obvious that
Frances does not agree with any adherents of first-order philosophical
theories. . . Or does he?
There might be one way out. It depends on the way we understand
‘suspending judgment’. Meta-skeptics are not very clear about this, but
the most plausible interpretation of this is that suspending judgment
means that one believes in the disjunction of the controversial claims.
Let’s say various philosophers believe in one or the other of the following
mutually exclusive theories: A,B and C. For example, adherents of
theory A believe this proposition: ‘A and not-B and not-C’. If this is
a case of peer disagreement, meta-skeptics suspend judgment about the
question. They come to believe in the disjunction of these views. That
is, they believe this: ‘A or B or C’. Notice that this way they seem to
agree with all of the disagreeing parties: all three groups agree that this
proposition is in fact true! Let’s pretend for a moment that this might
be a correct evaluation of the case.
In the context of philosophy, perhaps all parties participating in the
controversy have access to the same evidence. And supporters of theory
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A are committed to think that the evidence supports A’s truth and B’s
and C’s falseness. The meta-skeptic might or might not be an epistemic
peer of these parties. In case she is a peer, in believing only in the
disjunction of the controversial propositions, she is committed to think
that based on the evidence, A could just as well be true as B or C. That
implies that we do not have a decisive case for A’s truth. And this is
disagreed by A-ists.
What if adherents of A,B and C are – to use Frances’s term that is
central to his argument – epistemic superiors of the meta-skeptic? That
is a more difficult situation but at least there are some cases where the
skeptic knows about the popular arguments for A and B and C. And
adherents of these theories – let’s say A’s most prominent adherent –
might believe that only the familiarity with the popular arguments for
these views constitutes a decisive case for A. This philosopher believes
that even someone who is epistemically inferior in this question, has
every reason to believe A. This A-ist might say that the most well-
known argument in favor of A beats all the other theories. A B-ist
might say that the epistemically inferior agents should believe B, and a
C-ist might say that they should suspend judgment. In this case, the
epistemically inferior meta-skeptic is in the same situation as in the case
she is an epistemic peer of the three contending parties. I admitted that
this is a somewhat complicated case and it is not obvious whether it
does obtain in a particular situation or not. But I think it does quite
often. The case I have in mind is most similar to the question of Moorean
arguments: adherents of these think that the most familiar versions of
some arguments defeat all the other competing views (cf. [5, 115–117]).
We can develop this point further. It should be evident that experts
in epistemic questions have a distinguished role to play in this debate,
not only as participants but also as superiors whose opinion has a spe-
cial significance here. Either if someone is or is not a peer of them, the
position they take regarding this question might be the last word on
the issue. As I noted above, there is no unanimous consensus among
them. The situation is far from that. And it is most improbable that an
agreement is going to take shape around Frances’s most crucial claims.
And what about those who are epistemic inferiors in the very question
of meta-skepticism? Should they withhold judgment about it or not?
In their case, similarly to the one fleshed out above, not committing
themselves to follow either Frances or the non-meta-skeptics in this gen-
eral question seems to be incoherent or, rather, impossible: that would
mean they follow Frances indeed. Let’s consider the case of the out-
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sider presented by Brennan. She faces now with the differences of her
superiors: some believe that AD3 is true (regular meta-skeptics), others
believe AD3 is false (anti-meta-skeptics), still others withhold judgment
(Frances). Taking any of the three paths apparently open to her seem
to be fraught with troubling discordance, they lead to differences, and I
would say even to dissent in Plantinga’s sense. And this is not even a
point that is necessary to refute Frances himself: this is only a response
to a quite charitable interpretation of one of his claims, and I have al-
ready showed that investigating other statements made by him reveals
that his argument is in a bad shape.
After these intricate-looking arguments it is perhaps adequate to
shortly repeat the morals of the present section in which I tackled
Frances’s interesting approach to DM – with apologies for some re-
hearsal. Though he follows AD3, Frances suspends judgment about it
to avoid controversial beliefs. I pointed out that he does this for rea-
sons that amount to his controversial commitments (e.g., he endorses
AD3 as a rule of thumb while others do not). So he does not succeed
in avoiding controversy. Disregarding these controversial commitments
and considering a possible reply by him that he actually takes no posi-
tion regarding the truth-value of these or at least that he does not know
exactly what attitude he takes toward them, I judged that his replies
are inadequate. I finished up this line of thought by pointing to the def-
inition of disagreement by Plantinga (a top-notch epistemologist). He
seems to be correct in pointing out that disagreement happens not only
when someone believes p and someone else disbelieves p. The kind of
disagreement he calls dissenting does obtain between Frances and those
who take different propositional attitudes regarding AD3, so Frances’s
suspension of judgment does not save him from being a dissenter. The
main point of my last arguments could be captured as follows. Epistemic
superiors in philosophy disagree about all kinds of issues. Some of them
might very well hold that based on the evidence an average person has,
one should conclude as she, the superior with access to more relevant
evidence does. Since these are obviously epistemic questions, epistemol-
ogists’ propositional attitudes are likely to have the final word on the
whole issue: epistemologists are the superiors of superiors, that is, the
ultimate superiors here. So let’s apply the last point to their inferiors.
A minor philosopher or a layman could claim all the experts of the epis-
temology of disagreement to be her superiors, including anti-skeptics
and Frances himself. Now, these superiors shall take different stances
towards issues regarding disagreement. Which one should the epistem-
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ically inferior person follow in her doxastic practices? Since Frances’s
account is unable to provide a decisive answer for this person, she might
safely choose to follow a different superior instead of him. This means
that suspension of judgment is not the default best reaction to cases like
that; therefore meta-skepticism is not a privileged option that is free of
the problems it raises. Just like Brennan’s answer to the self-refutation
objection, Frances’s falls apart too. Or, at least, so I conclude.
4 Conclusion
Many people don’t like to disagree. As the social psychologist Joseph
Forgas ([3, ch. 14]) suggested, people often behave as if they had a
spontaneous inclination to agree with others. In the present paper I
argued that avoiding every disagreement is not an option in philosophy,
we can’t find a theoretical position that would make our situation so
convenient. I pointed out that even meta-skeptics, who want to avoid
every problem coming from disagreements, fail in this endeavor. They
end up disagreeing with non-skeptics and with other skeptics. Their
epistemic attitudes often seem to be arbitrary ones and are not met
with general acceptance. The upshot is that there are way too many
disagreements in philosophy and this very fact blocks the road leading
to the triumph of skeptical arguments from disagreement. If I am right,
my treatment of the problem of dissensus attributes even more weight
to it than meta-skeptics usually do.
I have to add one restriction to my criticism of meta-skeptics here.
There are other kinds of skeptics who are less similar to, say, Frances.
For example, more moderate skeptics could argue that we do not have
positive reason to believe in any philosophical proposition, but they may
not claim that we should suspend judgment about philosophy and they
may not claim that supporting any philosophical theory is blameworthy.
This kind of skepticism might have similar problems like the ones scru-
tinized here, but I did not show that above. A skeptic like that might
accept that she believes this with no positive or decisive reason. But she
believes in no obligation to suspend beliefs that have no positive case
behind them, and that way she does not seem to undermine her own
claim.12 Maybe she does not even believe in its authority. But at least
a prominent kind of (meta-)skepticism is well represented by AD and I
take it that I proved the untenable nature of that position.
My conclusion still seems to imply that we are all entangled in quite
deep philosophical disagreements – even ordinary non-philosophers are,
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since they are committed to some philosophical and epistemic views and
often they are also familiar with some simple arguments that play a role
in academic philosophy and which are unfavorable to their views. Phi-
losophy is a land of disagreements and it is impossible to break free from
dissensus. If you want to agree with everyone, you actually agree with
no one. If you think you should avoid every disagreement by suspending
judgment – you end up disagreeing with everyone who has any contested
beliefs. By taking this route, you quite likely immerse yourself in the
greatest dissensus possible.
Notes
1 I owe this version of the argument to Ja´nos To˝zse´r.
2 Nevertheless, traces of regular meta-skepticism actually lurk in Brennan’s paper.
He states that ‘the presence of widespread dissensus makes it difficult to de-
fend philosophy from outsider scepticism [his brand of skepticism], if not insider
scepticism [regular meta-skepticism, that is]’ [2, 2], and he only allows the possi-
bility of rational disagreement (which is the only way out for those who oppose
meta-skepticism according to him) for the sake of argument [2, 15].
3 Notice that Brennan’s thought-experiment works just as well with people who
are more error-avoiding than truth-seeking.
4 Searle made this remark in his lecture series The Philosophy of Mind, published
as audio cassettes by The Teaching Company, 1996.
5 Par excellence examples include Zeno’s paradoxes (his arguments for the non-
existence of motion), Diogenes’s rebuttal of these arguments (by walking), and a
kind of argument for skepticism about the external world (that rely on plausible
claims like that if you don’t know that you are not a brain-in-a-vat, then you don’t
know that you are sitting in a chair), and Moorean rebuttals of these arguments.
6 This seems to be the same problem as the so-called generality problem of the
reliabilist position in epistemology. Let me elaborate the problem raised in the
main text with using reliabilism as an example. Suppose that reliabilism is ac-
tually true and that reliabilists can identify a ‘reliabilist method’ that reliably
leads one to reliabilism: it leads those who employ it much more often to believe
reliabilism than to not believe its truth. (Perhaps this is going to be something
like being exposed to relibilist arguments more frequently than anti-reliabilist
views, reading reliabilists’ papers less critically than papers that argue for dif-
ferent epistemical positions, etc. For the present purposes no vices of methods
are relevant but leading to doxastic divergence.) We could say that, unlike the
‘philosophical methodology’ Brennan refers to, the ‘reliabilist method’ is a safe
one in the respect that Brennan is concerned with. This is because it does not
lead to disagreements, unlike philosophical methodology. From the perspective
of Brennan’s proposal, the latter is to be praised instead of the former.
7 E.g., answers to questions like what it means to believe something or what truth
is, and perhaps Brennan needs to settle the issues raised at the end of section 1.
He indicates that he needs the notions of reliability and epistemic peerage, but
he does not acknowledge that these are also sometimes subjects of dispute.
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8 Actually, the ‘I’ in Frances’s paper is rather elusive. He says that it is ‘somewhat
fictional’ [4, 426] and when this partially fictional protagonist discusses the DM,
he steps in for an imaginary character, Frank, and argues instead of him [4,
458]. Most of the time it is quite clear what views the reader might attribute
to Frances, but this situation complicates things in such a way that I have to
note that anything I claim about Frances here refers to the somewhat fictional
narrator of his paper.
9 It is not easy to give good concrete examples of philosophers who reasonably and
explicitly disagree with LSC, since an epistemic principle akin to it is seldom
addressed in the literature. Nevertheless, I am rather confident in saying that
there is a non-insignificant number of philosophers who believe things that go
against LSC and that many philosophers would follow the imaginary person in
the case that I used above, which is, though fictional, not unrealistic – and this
should create enough uneasiness for Frances.
10 The main reason why I am not investigating whether Frances might be in one of
the exception cases he lists (where someone disagrees with her superiors and is
still epistemically blameless) is that we are talking here about a case where he
stipulates that none of the exception cases hold. The other reason is more general.
To tell the truth, I can’t take seriously many of Frances’s claims. This is because
superiors might very well disagree about them. Let’s treat ‘epistemic superior’
as an intuitive concept: then our superiors can disagree about its relevance,
its content and its scope. They can disagree whether only actual disagreements
count or hypothetical disagreements count too. About what percent of dissenters
there should be among superiors to make one’s belief blameworthy or unjusti-
fied. Whether one might be blameless in holding argumentatively undefended
assumptions (or rather: intuitions) that contradict beliefs of superiors that are
just as undefended, whether superiors need to be familiar with all the arguments
the inferior has, and so on. If someone sides with a particular answer for these
dilemmas and still endorses an argument from disagreement with superiors, then
she has put herself into a questionable position – as did Frances, in my opinion.
(In fact, these problems are what motivate me in considering his initially promis-
ing strategy to evade the self-refutation objection.) The last argument in the
section about Frances sums up this worry. Another claim of Frances that seems
to me impossible to take seriously is this: ‘almost no one has ever even consid-
ered’ AD3 with respect to epistemic superiors instead of epistemic peers [4, 458].
I think there are virtually no important philosophers (at least today) who have
failed to consider a principle like that. A splendid example is a philosopher from
the past, Aurel Kolnai, who noted the following: ‘is not St Thomas a definitely
greater mind than I am? Assuredly he is. And so are Plato and Scotus, Hume
and Russell, Nietzsche and Heidegger, to omit a few others. Yet I cannot help
rejecting some of their opinions, if only because they are not always consistent
with one another.’ [9, 40] (In order to fully appreciate this quote, one needs to
know that Kolnai was the contemporary of both Russell and Heidegger.) This
suggests an argument from the disagreement between superiors instead of the ar-
gument from disagreement between inferiors and superiors: since your superiors
disagree among themselves, you have no other option but to sort out for yourself
what attitude you are going to take towards these issues.
11 Plantinga ([10, 178]) also notes that going further and further with withholding
judgment about evermore issues seem to deprive the meta-skeptic of being able
to hold that there is a problem with not following her or that her choice is better
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compared to other possibilities.
12 Compare this to [10, 189].
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